THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

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SOURCE

- 1. During the summer of 1950 a new mobilization scheme, called thoughtri makmi, was put into effect in Tibet, requiring estates in all parts of the country to supply one or more boys for the army. About 2,500 boys were recruited after the implementation of thongtri makmi, which may have brought the total size of the Tibetan Army up to 15,000 troops.
- 2. The new recruits were being trained in Lhasa, receiving instruction in arms drill, marching and discipline, but no practice in range firing. Tibet is too short of ammunition to allow it to be used up in training.\* When the recruits finish training, they are issued rifles and a small amount of ammunition.
- 5. The army is organized administratively under the administrative districts of Tibet. There are about 5,000 troops in Magchuka under the personal command of Ragashar Shape, the new Minister of Defense, and about 5,000 in and around Chiangtu (97-07, 31-10) on the eastern border. Small squads of mobile troops have been sent out to all parts of Tibet to watch for infiltration by Communists.\*\*
- 4. Before his appointment as Minister of Defense, Ragashar Shape held the rank of Teiji (next below that of Shape), but occupied no particular position. He knows nothing of military matters. He is considered honest, conservative, and generally opposed to opening up Tibet to western influence. With him in Nagchuka is Kunsgang Se, who was appointed commander in chief of the Tibetan Army during the past year. Kunsang Se has had no experience in military affairs.
- 5. The Tibetan Government in early October 1950 was resolved to fight any Communist invasion. According to Jassak S. S. Surba, also known as Surkhang, the Foreign minister, the invasion is expected to come from the east, and the following plans for defense have been made: When invasion occurs, the forces from Magchuka will be sent eastward to try to form a defense wall just west of the Yushu-Riwoche (approximately 96-20, 31-20) line and slightly north of Changtu. The forces at Changtu will link up with the forces from Nagobuka, forming a defense frontier from Yushu to

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Ch'angtu. Should the Tibetan forces at Ch'angtu be cut off from the Nagchuka forces, or driven out of Ch'angtu. they would be able to retreat to Sadiya, Assam, pass through northern India and return to the front by way of Gangtok, Gyangtse (89-40, 26-29), Lhasa and the road to Ch'angtu. Should this be necessary, the Nagchuka forces would try to hold both roads to Lhasa in the interim, the road from Yushu and the road from Ch'angtu.\*\*\*

- 6. Two areas have been marked off for airfields behind the Potala in Lhasa, on a surface of hard sand. These fields could be put in good condition for air traffic within seven days.
- For adequate defense, Tibet needs military advisers and technicians even more than arms.

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